

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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COUNTRY	USSR (Far East)/Korea/China	REPORT	
SUBJECT	The Korean War and Sino-Soviet Relations	DATE DISTR.	16 April 1954
		NO. OF PAGES	2
DATE OF INFO.		REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
PLACE ACQUIRED		REFERENCES	25X1

This is UNEVALUATED Information

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Korean War

1. [redacted] the Soviet Government never had any intention of actually participating in the Korean War, and would not have done so even if the UN forces had succeeded in occupying all of Korea. The Soviets realized that active intervention would have meant the start of the Third World War, for which they were in no sense prepared. Soviet involvement in the Korean War was limited to staff planning and operational guidance (exercised through a special Soviet headquarters in Manchuria), the assignment of pilots, and, of course, the provision of military supplies. 25X1
2. [redacted] the Korean War was originally a purely Soviet-North Korean affair and, with the Chinese kept au courant, there was no question of Chinese participation until the UN advance to the Yalu River. Special representatives [redacted] were sent from Moscow to Peiping to discuss the Korean conflict after the failure of the original campaign and the advance of the UN forces to the Yalu. 25X1
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3. [redacted] the North Korean attack was launched on specific Soviet instructions. The basic assumption was that the US would not react and would not send troops into Korea. In this connection, the Soviets were fully aware that the only American troops in the Far East were the two poorly-equipped, poorly-trained, and under-strength divisions then stationed in Japan. The Soviets, then, had counted on a blitzkrieg that would have been won before the US could intervene effectively, even had the US intended to do so. The unexpected US intervention and the consequent successes of the UN forces in autumn and winter 1950 vitiated the Soviets' original plans and placed the USSR in a most embarrassing position. 25X1
4. [redacted] the initiative for beginning armistice negotiations in Korea came from the Soviets. [redacted] the reasons for this may have been the following: a) the fact that the war was imposing an excessive strain on the Soviet economy, and b) that the Soviets wanted to regain face by suggesting 25X1

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an armistice. Another possible reason may have been that it was hoped that the initial armistice talks would give the Chinese and North Koreans a breathing-spell that could be used to re-group their forces for a new attack.

5. [redacted] whether the Army, the Party, or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the most critical of the handling of the Korean War. However, there were two schools of thought within the General Staff: one held that the whole war had been miserably botched, while the other felt that the war was going as well as could be expected and that the UN forces would eventually be defeated in the field. The latter was the more general view. 25X1

6. [redacted] the Soviet diplomatic representation in North Korea did not play any significant role during the Korean War. The Soviet representatives simply passed on the Moscow directives to KIM Il-sung. Captain Anatoliy Erastovich Vasilyev, former member of the MVD rezidentura attached to the North Korean Government, [redacted] when the North Korean Government fled across the border into Manchuria in 1950, the Soviet Embassy fled with it and was more or less scattered in the general rout. Vasilyev also stated that Colonel Ivan Alekseyevich Vashkin, MVD rezident attached to the North Korean Government, was severely disciplined for abandoning his post without permission during the 1950 retreat. 25X1

7. KIM Il-sung visited Moscow in 1949 as the head of a North Korean delegation. On at least one occasion while he was there he had a personal conversation with Stalin. [redacted] important decisions had been reached. [redacted] after the start of the Korean War, that they may well have been connected with the eventual North Korean attack. 25X1

Sino-Soviet Relations

8. [redacted] the Soviet leaders do not trust fully the Chinese and the North Korean leaders, but has no information on the possibility of differences of opinion between the Chinese and Soviets. [redacted] while the Soviets insist that the Chinese turn over to them all types of information they possess, the Soviets in turn give the Chinese no more than they have to. 25X1

9. [redacted] the Chinese had planned to attack Formosa in 1950. Although the Chinese lacked enough landing craft and other vessels, it was the opinion of both the Soviets and Chinese themselves that a successful attack on Formosa could be made using a large number of rafts to transport the troops. This scheme was abandoned because of the naval blockade by the US Seventh Fleet. [redacted] the US naval blockade was considered by the Soviets as a very shrewd move. 25X1

10. [redacted] Chinese plans in southeastern Asia. [redacted] when the Soviets recognized the Viet Minh regime, a military mission and intelligence personnel were sent from Moscow to make a study of the situation. Several meetings between Ho Chih Minh and top Soviet leaders, including Stalin, were held on Soviet territory, [redacted] Ho Chih Minh often held meetings with MAO Tse-tung somewhere in China. 25X1

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